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CIVIL DEFENSE AND LAW 
Val Peterson':' 
"Government under our system is a resultant of the three 
forces of Federal, State, and local power. It is the sum total of 
these forces operating upon the individual that defines his rights 
and obligations with reference to his community, his state, and 
his nation. The ways in which these forces have been weighted 
as against each other have always presented fascinating and signi-
ficant problems in government both in peace and war. Nowhere 
is that more true today than in the field of civilian defense, for 
civilian defense either in terms of protection or in its promotion 
of the essential civilian war services requires the interaction of 
all these forces. 
"Difficult problems of government, of administration, of in-
tercommunity and interstate cooperation, consequently exist. These 
in a true sense are the real problems of 'law' in civilian defense, 
for it is their neglect that has made and will make for confusion 
and inefficiency."1 
To assure a lessening of this "confusion and inefficiency" 
there must be an understanding and appreciation of the legislative 
history of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.2 0 
For the purposes of this brief introductory article, let us 
focus our attention on the broader aspects of that history. 
On May 22, 1941, the President, by an Executive Order,3 
established the Office of Civilian Defense. This new office was 
set up within the Office for Emergency Management of the Execu-
tive Office of the President. 
The Office of Civilian Defense was to serve as a planning 
* Federal Civil Defense Administrator. 
1 James M. Landis, United States Director of Civilian Defense, Wash-
ington, D.C., March, 1943. 
2 64 Stat. 1245 (1951), 50 u.s.c. §§ 2251-2297 (1952). Hereinafter 
referred to as the act. 
a E:xec. Order No. 8757, 6 Fed. Reg. 2517 (1941). 
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and advisory body, and as a center for the coordination of federal 
civil defense activities which involved relationships between the 
federal government and state and local governments. It was the 
forerunner to the present Federal Civil Defense Administration. 
For the purposes of our discussion, assume that in 1948 you 
were elected to the Congress of the United States. 
You're fortunate to land an assignment on the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, and your first legislative problem has to do with 
the civil defense of the Nation. 
How do you handle it, what do you know about it, what can you 
contribute to its solution? 
It is an overwhelming problem, complex in its organization, 
massive in its requirements, without precedent in its purpose. 
Where do you begin to translate this tremendous task into 
workable legislation? 
The purpose of civil defense seems to be very clear. It can 
be stated in simple terms by the selection of just a few words, 
"the reduction of damage and casualties in case of an attack." 
It seems simple enough, needs no further elaboration, and yet 
what else does it appear to be? You wonder if it isn't non-military 
defense in the broadest terms. You wonder if it is not the pro-
tection of our industrial capacity and our skilled labor. 
Is it in fact the preservation of our total war potential and in-
c deed our economy? Is it the preservation and continuity of our 
whole system of Government? With what perspective do you, as 
a new congressman, view the problem? You ask yourself, "Is this 
really a vital part of the total national defense, or simply one of 
those necessary local by-products whose value can be seriously 
questioned"? 
As a member of the Committee you have at your disposal the 
voluminous public and private studies on the subject. Your Com-
mittee hears the testimony of governors and mayors, of business-
men and civic leaders, of soldiers and scientists, of city planners 
and farm leaders. 
You listen to the long, the short, and the tall, and many varie-
ties, versions and concepts of how the problem ought to be tackled. 
In addition, you have before you a proposed draft of legislation. 
Your Committee begins to shape a statute along these lines. 
The proposed law begins to read: 
CIVIL DEFENSE AND LAW 
It is the policy and intent of Congress to provide a plan of 
civil defense for the protection of life and property in the United 
States .... 4 
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You offer no comment when language is agreed upon defin-
ing the problem. The responsibility sounds even greater than 
you had visualized. 
The bill reads: 
The term "civil defense" means all those activities and meas-
ures designed or undertaken (1) to minimize the effects upon the 
civilian population caused or which would be caused by an attack 
upon the United States, (2) to deal with the immediate emergency 
conditions which would be created by any such attack, and ( 3) to 
effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, 
vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such at-
tack. Such terms shall include, but shall not be limited to, (A) 
measures to be taken in preparation for anticipated attack (in-
cluding the establishment of appropriate organizations, operational 
plans, and supporting agreements; the recruitment and training 
of personnel; the conduct of research; the procurement and stock-
piling of necessary materials and supplies; the provision of suit-
able warning systems; the construction or preparation of shelters, 
shelter areas, and control centers; and, when appropriate, the 
non-military evacuation of civil population); (B) measures to be 
taken during attack (including the enforcement of passive defense 
regulations prescribed by duly established military or civil au-
thorities; the evacuation of personnel to shelter areas; the con-
trol of traffic and panic; and the control and use of lighting and 
civil communications); and {C) measures to be taken following 
attack (including activities for fire fighting; rescue, emergency 
medical, health and sanitation services; monitoring for specific 
hazards of special weapons; unexploded bomb reconnaissance; es-
sential debris clearance; emergency welfare measures; and im-
mediately essential emergency repair or restoration of damaged 
vital facilities) .5 
After hearing this definition, you turn the page back to the 
declaration of policy and read part of it again: 
. . . . [T]his responsibility for civil defense shall be vested pri-
marily in the several States and their political subdivisions. The 
Federal Government shall provide coordination and guidance ..•. o 
You ponder the measure and burden of responsibility and 
wonder if it will work. You ponder the wisdom of calling such 
tragic death and destruction a local problem. 
Subsequent hearings and committee sessions see legislation 
4 64 Stat. 1246 (1951), 50 U.S.C. § 2251 (1952). 
6 Id. § 2252(b). 
6 Id. § 2251. 
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formed that creates a Federal Civil Defense Administration, places 
the Administrator directly under the supervision of the President, 
.and directs him to prepare a national plan for the civil defense 
of the nation. 
It anthorizes him to establish offices, communications, and 
stockpiles; conduct research; establish training schools; dissemi-
nate information to the public; and make financial contributions 
to the states for civil defense purposes. 
The legjslation provides for broad emergency powers to be 
exercised only during the existence of the emergency. Such powers 
can be exercised without regard to the limitations of existing law. 
They provide for speedy acquisition of facilities and materials 
needed, authority to incur obligations on behalf of the United 
States, provide financial assistance, reimburse the states, and 
grant power to direct all relief activities of the federal govern-
ment.7 
Some ten months of congressional consideration of the prob-
lem finds a bill on the floor of the Senate. 
On December 21, 1950, the Senator handling the bill ad-
dresses his colleagues: 
l\Ir. President, we are today considering ... a bill to round 
out the national defense of the United States by establishing a 
program for civil defense. . . . 
... The Senate .Armed Services Committee and the Joint 
Committee on .Atomic Energy are agreed that there is no more 
pressing problem facing the country today than is the prompt en-
actment of legislation in this field. . . . 
. . . [The legislation] is designed to provide only a small 
Federal agency to guide and coordinate an extensive Federal and 
State structure which will be largely manned by volunteer 
forces .... 
. . . In approaching the problem of establishing a civil de-
fense plan. the committee has unanimously concurred in the propo-
sition that it must be solved at the local level. ... 
. . . It is estimated that this bill will cost over a period of 
three years between 3 billion and 3 billion, 200 million dollars. 
Of this amount, approximately 54 per cent will be furnished by 
the Federal Government and 46 per cent by the State and local 
communities. . . .s 
Another Senator rises to say: 
7 Id. at 1252, § 2293. 
s 96 Cong. Rec. 16923, 16924 (1950). 
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. It seems to me that if the States are not suffici(mtly in-
terested to put up their share of money . . . the Federal Govern-
ment should not put up a penny .... 9 
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The Senator handling the bill reads to his colleagues a portion 
of his committee's report: 
It is a problem of survival to be solved by the individual, 
the community, and the State, under the guidance and coordina-
tion of the Federal Government. It is not intended that this 
program will be operated and controlled by the Federal Govern-
ment, but rather that the Government furnish the necessary guid-
ance and cooperation along with certain assistance in financing 
the program.10 
Before passage of the bill, a vigorous and forceful opponent 
of the emergency provisions of the act states : 
Mr. President, if the bill becomes law it will be one of the 
most drastic and far-reaching laws ever placed on the statute 
books of our country .... 11 
And in the House a member rises to state: 
. . . It is recognized that this bill will give to the Adminis-
trator considerable power, but on the other hand, it must be 
realized that in the event of an enemy attack such powers will be 
absolutely necessary. . . .12 
A colleague indicates: 
In case of an atomic attack the power of the Administrator 
would be almost unlimited . 
. . . I am not so sure that he does not have more power than 
the President of the United States.13 
Another gentleman rises to say: 
• It is no exaggeration to call this civil-defense legislation a 
revolutionary departure in our jurisprudence. We are entering 
upon waters still in good part uncharted; we cannot be sure that 
the measure now before the Congress is the final answer to our 
problem-the field is too new for final answers. But I am con-
fident that this legislation gets us off to a good start, and I know 
that the Congress will keep our civil-defense preparations under 
constant review.14 
So with that background, in that atmosphere, and with many 
9 Id. at 16972. 
10 Id. See S. Rep. No. 2683, Slst Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). 
11 Id. at 17091. 
12 Id. at 16826. 
13 96 Cong. Rec. 16831, 16830 (1950). 
H Id. at 16838. 
422 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
reservations, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 became law. 
What, then, are some of the effects of this law as they relate 
to the private citizen if there were an enemy attack upon the 
Nation? 
As an example of the broad powers conferred upon the Ad-
ministrator under Title III, let's look at the question of his powers 
over private property during the emergency period. No principle 
of law is more firmly embedded in our jurisprudence than that 
of private property rights. Each legislative act or i·ule of law in-
fringing upon an owner's freedom of enjoyment or use of his 
property is considered an exception to the rule, and ordinarily 
narrowly construed. 
Does the Administrator have the authority to requisition pri-
vate homes or commercial buildings for the housing of operational 
personnel and private automotive vehicles for transport of per-
sonnel-under conditions where a civil defense emergency exists 
as provided in section 301 of the act? 
For our purposes here, we may define requisition as the 
direct appropriation of private property for public purposes with-
out judicial proceedings and without or against the consent of the 
owner. 
Section 201 (h) of the act authorizes the Administrator to 
procure by condemnation or otherwise, construct, lease, transport, 
store, maintain, renovate or distribute materials and facilities for 
civil defense, with the right to take immediate possession thereof. 
The third proviso of this section states: 
That on and after January 1, 1952, the Administrator shall 
not acquire any land, or any interest therein, pursuant to the 
provisions of this subsection unless such acquisition shall first 
have been specifically authorized by the Congress. • 
Section 303 (a) authorizes the Administrator to exercise dur-
ing a civil defense emergency the authority contained in section 
201 (h) without regard to the limitation of any existing law. 
Section 3 ( d) states that "The word 'materials' shall include 
raw materials, supplies, medicines, equipment, component parts 
and technical information and processes necessary for civil de-
fense." 
Section 3(e) states that "The word 'facilities', except as other-
wise provided in this Act, shall include buildings, shelters, utili-
ties, and land." 
Section 306 (a) provides that except in the case of property 
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acquired pursuant to section 201 (h) in conformity with the pro-
visions of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act 
of 1949 or through judicial proceedings for condemnation, the 
Administrator shall promptly determine the amount of compensa-
tion to be paid for the property. If the person entitled to receive 
the amount so determined as just compensatfon is unwilling to 
accept the same, he shall be paid promptly seventy-five per 
centum of such amount and shall be entitled to recover from the 
United States in an action in the Court of Claims or in any dis-
trict court of the United States such additional amount, if any, 
which, when added to the amount so paid to him, shall be just 
compensation. 
The language of section 201 (h), "procure by condemnation 
or otherwise," provides for the taking of private property through 
proceedings for condemnation in a court of competent jurisdiction 
and is not open to serious question. What is of concern is whether 
this statute also permits the property to be requisitioned in the 
manner previously defined. 
While condemnation, as used in the law of property, is fre-
quently associated with judicial proceedings for the acquisition 
of property, 15 it actually has the broader meaning of taking of 
private property for public use. The courts have said that any 
taking by one possessing the power of eminent domain is con-
sidered a condemnation,16 and they have used "condemnation" 
synonymously with "taking."17 
In discussing the taking of lands by a flooding thereof it was 
said: 
The taking was under the sovereign power of eminent do-
main. The President and Secretary of War were authorized to 
purchase or condemn the lands. . . . And from the taking there 
arose an implied promise by the United States to compensate the 
plaintiff for his loss.is 
In discussing the power of requisitioning under the Lever 
Act of World War I the court said : 
... [A]cquisition of property under the Lever Act is only 
a summary species of what are commonly called condemnation 
proceedings. The justification for any condemnation is the neces-
15 See Dep't of Justice, Acquisition of Property for War Purposes 42 
(1944). 
16 Dickinson v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 137 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1943). 
11 Central Nebraska Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist. v. Fairchild, 126 
F.2d 302, 305 (8th Cir. 1942). 
1s Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 370 (1924). 
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sity of taking something from a private person for a public use; 
and the justification for the summary procedure of the act under 
consideration is the overwhelming necessity for speed under the 
dreadful pressure of war.19 
Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1954) defines 
condemn, as used in law, "to pronounce to be taken for public use 
under the right of eminent domain" and condemnation as the act 
of condemning. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) defines 
condemnation, in real property law, as "the process by which 
property of a private owner is taken for public use, without his 
consent, but upon the award and payment of just compensa-
tion. . . ." Thus the words "procure by condemnation" may be 
deemed to authorize the Administrator to seize private property 
without defining the method to be pursued. However, it is not 
necessary to resort to such legal refinement, for the authority 
granted by Congress is more complete, being contained in the 
phrase "procure by condemnation or otherwise." This phrase is 
set off from the rest of the sentence by a comma following the 
word "otherwise,'' indicating that "otherwise" was intended to 
modify "procure" and not "construct, lease," etc. "Otherwise" 
as used in this sense means "in a different manner," "in another 
way" or "in other ways"20 and therefore the authority granted 
may be read as procure by condemnation or in other ways. To 
hold that "otherwise" modified construct, lease, etc., would lead 
to the absurd conclusion that the only method for acquiring title 
to materials or facilities would be by condemnation. Such an 
interpretation would also conflict with the other language of 
section 201 (h). For instance, the first proviso of this section pro-
vides that facilities acquired by "purchase, donation, or other 
means" may be occupied prior to approval of title by the Attorney 
General. Obviously, this contemplates acquisition by means other 
than condemnation. 
We may therefore say that Congress has granted the broadest 
possible procurement authority. Now, in non-emergency periods 
this authority, by virtue of section 201 (h), may be exercised 
only in accordance with requirements of existing law. But, dur-
ing an emergency the Administrator may exercise this authority 
without regard to limitations of any existing law. Therefore, 
during an emergency the Administrator need not follow the laws 
w United States v. Benedict, 280 Fed. 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1922), aff'd, 261 
U.S. 294 (1922); cf. Filbin Corp. v. United States, 266 Fed. 911 (E.D.S.C. 
1920). 
20 Dunham v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Ry., 106 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 
1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 661 (1939). 
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regulating the taking of property but may directly seize property, 
compensating the owner as provided in section 306 (a). Section 
306 (a) provides for payment of just compensation when property 
is acquired other than in conformity with the provisions of the 
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 or 
through judicial proceedings for condemnation.21 The language 
of this section confirms our conclusion that section 303 (a) au-
thorizes requisitioning of property, for its sole purpose is to secure 
just compensation to the owner when property is taken other than 
by judicial proceedings. 
Further evidence that Congress intended the Administrator 
to have authority to requisition materials and facilities is found 
in the legislative history of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 
In the original bills as introduced in both the House and 
Senate22 the procurement authority for ordinary and emergency 
periods was found in section 7. While the bills were in Committee 
(House and Senate) they were rewritten by placing the non-emer-
gency and emergency authority in different titles. In the hear-
ings held before the House Subcommittee the procurement au-
thority was discussed and a question was raised as to power to 
seize property in non-emergency periods.23 It was explained that 
under Title II it was intended to make the Administrator subject 
to authorizing legislation but that during an emergency the au-
thority given was to seize property.24 In debate on the House bill, 
Mr. Short, a member of the Subcommittee, explained the emer-
gency powers as being very broad and stated that after an at-
tack the Administrator could "confiscate land and property of 
any kind."25 At the beginning of the debate in the Senate an 
amendment to the bill was offered by Senator Ives. This amend-
ment is now section 306 (a) in Public Law 920. In explaining his 
reasons for offering this amendment, Senator Ives stated that if 
the Administrator exercised the authority to requisition, granted 
in Title II of the Defense Production Act, then the remedial langu-
age contained in that act would protect property owners; but if 
the Administrator acted under section 303 (a), the procedure for 
payment of just compensation provided in the Defense Produc-
21 Cf. Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 799 (later amended by 
65 Stat. 132 (1951) ), 50 U.S.C. § 2081 (1952). 
22 H.R. 9798, s. 4217 and S. 4219, 8lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). 
23 Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services of the House on 
Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and l\filitary Departments, 8lst 
Cong., 2d Sess., at 7876-79 (1950). 
24 Id. at 7878. 
25 96 Cong. Rec. 16830 (1950). 
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ti on Act would not attach. He therefore felt that this amend-
ment was necessary to protect property owners, and it was ac-
cepted on this basis.26 
Again in the Senate debate, Senator Cordon argued that the 
authority contained in section 303 (a) was too broad and that the 
phrase "without regard to the limitation of any existing law" 
should be deleted. It was his opinion that under this section the 
Administrator would be authorized to take property without pay-
ment of compensation. Senator Kefauver (manager of the bill on 
the floor) explained that provision for compensation was provided 
by reference to the Defense Production Act and also by the Ives 
amendment.27 
In summation we can conclude that Congress intended the 
Administrator to have the authority, during a civil defense emer-
gency, to seize real and personal property either by judicial pro-
ceedings for condemnation or through requisitioning with payment 
of just compensation as provided in section 306 (a). The au-
thority for this conclusion may be found in the language of sec-
tion 303 (a) and section 201 (h), in construing these sections in 
context with section 306 (a) and in the legislative history of the 
act. 
Some consideration should be given to whether or not the 
limitations of the third proviso of section 201 (h) of the act, and 
the limitations of section 601 of Public Law 155, 82d Cong., 1st 
Sess., are applicable to the procurement of real property during 
an emergency. 
The third proviso to section 201 (h) of the act provides: 
That on and after January 1, 1952, the Administrator shall 
not acquire any land, or any interest therein, pursuant to the 
provisions of this subsection unless such acquisition shall first 
have been specifically authorized by the Congress. 
The question is whether this clause also qualifies section 303 
(a) since that authority is not complete in itself but authorizes 
the Administrator to exercise the authority contained in section 
201 (h). Unfortunately, the meaning of the language employed 
is not entirely clear; and inasmuch as this proviso was inserted in 
conference, the legislative history is of little value. What may 
be deemed determinative of the question is the fact that the pro-
20 Id. at 16959. 
21 Id. at 16977. But cf., Testimony of Mr. James E. Palmer and Mr. 
Ralph Luttrell, Dep't of Justice, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 169 (19·50). 
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viso quoted above is, by its very terms, applicable only to ac-
quisitions made "pursuant to the provisions" of that subsection. 
The power to procure property during an emergency is found in 
section 303 (a) which authorizes the Administrator to exercise 
the authority contained fo section 201 (h) without regard to the 
limitations of any existing law. It may therefore be said that 
emergency acquisitions are made pursuant to the provisions of 
section 303 (a) even though this section is dependent upon section 
201 (h). Since the requirement of the proviso in question is 
limited to acquisitions made pursuant to section 201 (h), it can 
be concluded that specific congressional authorization is probably 
not required when land, or an interest therein, is acquired during 
an emergency. This construction is in accord with the presump-
tion ,that "a proviso refers only to the provision to which it is 
attached"28 and is borne out by the nature of the authority of 
section 303 (a). It is emergency authority for immediate action 
without regard to the limitations of any existing law. To hold 
that Congress intended to impede administrative action so broadly 
authorized would def eat the purpose of the grant. 
Methods of taking property for civil defense purposes, with-
out or against the consent of the owner, under emergency con-
ditions, may be summarized as: 
(a) "Requisitioning" under Section 303 (a). 
By virtue of this provision any private property which comes 
within the classification of "materials" or "facilities" may 
be seized by FCDA during a civil defense emergency. When 
this power is exercised, the procedure established by section 
306 (a) must be followed. 
(b) Condemnation through Judicial Proceedings under section 
303 (a). 
FCDA may also acquire immediate possession of property 
during a civil defense emergency by virtue of the judicial 
process. When this procedure is utilized (recommended 
where real property is involved) immediate possession of 
the property may be obtained by the filing of a "Declaration 
of Taking" and depositing the estimated compensation along 
with the petition in the United States district court having 
jurisdiction of the area within which the land is located. 
It should be apparent to both attorneys and laymen alike, that 
the authority to seize private property, even under conditions of 
enemy attack upon the home shores, is an authority which must 
be exercised with restraint and good judgment. Obviously, the 
2ssee United States v. McClure, 305 U.S. 472, 478 (1939). 
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Congress in its passage of the act, when balancing the good of 
the Nation against private property rights during a period of 
emergency, considered that the property rights of the individual 
must be subjugated to those of the survival of the country. As 
the Supreme Court has indicated, the power to wage war is the 
power to wage war successfully. To avoid an indiscriminate and 
perhaps wholly unnecessary taking of private property and in order 
to assure the survival of the Nation, reasonable and workable 
plans must be formulated to permit the immediate galvanizing of 
measures necessary to preserve life and property under an enemy 
attack. As broad general guide lines, the Administrator would 
exercise the authority of seizure only: 
(1) When the need is such as not to admit any delay or re-
sort to other sources of supply, or 
(2) When other means of obtaining the property upon fair 
and reasonable terms have been exhausted. 
The nature of real property, and the technicalities of the law 
relating thereto, are usually of such a nature that time consuming 
and perplexing questions often require involved judicial proceed-
ings for the determination of the proper person to receive pay-
ment, and especially of what constitutes a fair value under the 
circumstances. These proceedings would render ineffectual any-
thing other than an immediate determination of the fair value 
of the property and payment to the owner of seventy-five per 
centum of this value under the Administrator's authority, thus 
leaving the question of fair compensation open without an un-
constitutional seizure involving no recompense to the owner. Where 
realty is involved, plans must be made under section 303 (a) to 
permit the immediate taking of possession and a determination 
of an arbitrary fair value until the question can be judicially re-
solved. This is particularly true if the question of ownership is 
under cloud or in dispute, as so often happens when the question 
of title is before the court. 
Thus, from this brief introduction of law as it relates to the 
civil defense of the Nation, it is easily perceived that serious prob-
lems of law will inevitably arise from the impact of enemy at-
tack upon the United States in this thermonuclear age. In sub-
sequent articles we will seek to discuss some of the legal problems 
inherent in civil defense activities, particularly as they reach 
down into the minutia and detail of daily living. 
